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What happens when well-defined disciplines meet or are confronted with 
transdisciplinary discourses and concepts, where transdisciplinary concepts 
are analytical tools rather than specifications of a field of objects or a class of 
entities? ‘Gender’, ‘race’, ‘structure’ and ‘art’ are perhaps exemplary 
transdisciplinary concepts in this respect. Or, if disciplines reject 
transdisciplinary discourses and concepts as having no part to play in their 
practice, why do they so reject them? This essay will address these questions 
through a discussion of the relationship between philosophy – the most tightly 
policed discipline in the humanities – and what I will argue is the 
emblematically transdisciplinary practice of feminist theory, via a discussion of 
interdisciplinarity and related terms in gender studies. I will argue that the 
tendency of philosophy to reject feminist theory in fact correctly intuited that 
the two defining features of feminist theory – its constitutive tie to a political 
agenda for social change and the transdisciplinary character of many of its 
central concepts – are indeed at odds with, and pose a threat to, the 
traditional insularity of the discipline of philosophy. I will argue that feminist 
theory operates with what we should now recognise as a set of 
transdisciplinary concepts – including, sex, gender, woman, sexuality and 
sexual difference – and that the use of these concepts (particularly ‘gender’) 
in feminist philosophy has been the most far-reaching continuation in the late 
20th/early 21st centuries of the critique of philosophy initiated by Marx and 
pursued by ‘critical theory’. This puts feminist philosophy in a difficult position: 
its transdisciplinary aspects open it up to an unavoidable contradiction. 
Nonetheless, I will argue, this is a contradiction that can and must be endured 
and made productive. 
 In order to draw out the specificity of the concept of transdisciplinarity 
at issue here I will begin with a discussion of attempts to define inter- and 
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transdisciplinarity, particularly in gender studies. Arguing for the 
transdisciplinary origin of the concept of gender, I will then suggest one way of 
understanding its function as a critical concept, before making explicit how 
this leads to the historical antagonism between traditional philosophy and the 
critical, transdisciplinary concept of gender and with feminist theory more 
generally.1 
 
Multi-, inter- and transdisciplinarity in gender studies 
First, then, what is ‘transdisciplinarity’, as this essay proposes to understand 
it? How is it different from ‘inter’- and ‘multi’-disciplinarity? As Peter Osborne 
suggests in his Introduction to the Dossier on ‘Transdisciplinarity in French 
Thought’ (Osborne, 2011: 16), one might take the definitions of inter- and 
multi-disciplinarity given by the major funding body for Arts and Humanities 
research in the UK (the AHRC) as a – soon to be transcended – starting point. 
According to these definitions, interdisciplinarity characterises work by an 
individual that draws on more than one discipline, while multidisciplinarity 
characterises work done by a team of individuals from more than one 
discipline. In each case the idea of specific disciplinary knowledges, concepts, 
practices and methods is maintained in the context of a recognition of the 
virtue of communication between them, according to the presumption that 
different disciplines can learn from each other and can contribute differently, 
but complementarily, to the analysis or understanding of a given phenomenon 
or problem. In distinction from these, the hypothesis here is that 
transdisciplinary theory and its concepts are not necessarily identifiable with 
any specific disciplinary fields, either in their origin or application. In this paper 
feminist theory in general and the concept of gender in particular will be a test 
case for this hypothesis. 
 According to the above AHRC definitions of multidisciplinarity and 
interdisciplinarity, the latter is the more challenging practice – both for the 
practitioner herself and for the disciplines with which she intersects. However, 
                                            
1 The research for this paper was conducted as part of the project 
'Transdisciplinarity and the Humanities: Problems, Methods, Histories, 
Concepts', funded by the Arts and Humanities Research Council 
(AH/I004378/1). 
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the restricted scope of the AHRC definition of interdisciplinarity is clear when 
we consider that it in fact excludes most of the interdisciplinary practice of the 
past century, or at least most attempts at it. For intellectual cultures of 
interdisciplinarity and the literature that addresses it have tended to concern 
not lone researchers, but collaborative ventures and fields of collective 
endeavour: the anti-disciplines, or non-disciplines or post-disciplines that 
circumscribe their fields as ‘studies’ – Gender Studies, Feminist Studies, 
Psychosocial Studies, Critical Race Studies, Translation Studies, Education 
Studies, Cultural Studies, Area Studies, and so on.2 This restriction is, of 
course, intentional. The AHRC’s definition of interdisciplinarity is stipulative, 
not descriptive; it concerns what, for the purposes of a grant application, shall 
be called ‘interdisciplinary’. In contrast, where definitions are offered from 
within intellectual fields that claim to practice interdisciplinarity (rather than 
simply promise to fund it) we are offered what seem to be descriptive 
definitions. In these, much more is at stake than the clarity of terms. In gender 
studies,3 for example, which I will concentrate on here not least because of 
the contrast with Philosophy, the extensive literature on multi-, inter- and 
transdiciplinarity is concerned to a great extent with the nature of the field 
itself – its being-interdisciplinary – and with its institutionalisation and 
institutional practices and forms: its modes of pedagogy, the construction of 
academic programmes, its modes of dissemination, and so on. An 
examination of the definitions of concepts of inter- and transdisciplinarity in 
some of this literature in gender studies and other fields will allow the 
specificity of the concept of transciplinarity proposed in this essay to become 
visible. 
Of course, different definitions of interdisciplinarity abound even within 
gender studies. Nevertheless some consensus has emerged as to the 
definition of multidisciplinarity and its difference from interdisciplinarity. In 
particular interdisciplinarity is often said to ‘go beyond’ multidisciplinarity, 
                                            
2 Granted, teaching programmes and the building of institutions are outside of 
the remit of the AHRC; but the point holds in relation to collaborative research 
too. 
3 From here on I use ‘gender studies’ (lower case) as shorthand to cover 
Gender Studies, Feminist Studies, Women’s Studies, Masculinity Studies, and 
all related fields. In this I follow Tuija Pulkkinen, this issue. 
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which tends to be seen as a somewhat conservative approach to the extent 
that it leaves disciplines and their various methodologies intact.4 
Interdisciplinarity, in Andermahr, Lovell and Wolkowitz’s words, goes beyond 
multidisciplinarity in ‘carving out an area of study whose organizing theoretical 
and methodological frame is constructed from cross-disciplinary sources, so 
that a new synthetic field is created over time.’ (Quoted in Lykke, 2011: 139) 
In interdisciplinarity the insights from different disciplines do not accrue, they 
are mixed or blended. In interdisciplinary work one does not stay on one side 
of a boundary but straddles it, working on it (so-called ‘boundary work’); or, 
disciplinary boundaries are not respected but rather crossed, or transgressed. 
(Lykke, 2011: 142)5 The rhetoric of interdisciplinarity in gender studies often 
implies that there is always something admirably iconoclastic and 
transgressive about the interdisciplinary researcher. However, in other areas 
definitions of interdisciplinarity may be part of an aspiration to unity or even 
totality that might seem, from the perspective of gender studies, altogether 
more conventional.6 Claims about the interdisciplinarity of a field may also be 
presented as a matter of necessity, rather than a matter of laudable choice – 
for example in Education Studies and Translation Studies – and related to an 
aspiration to ‘disciplinarity’.7  
 For many theorists, the problem with interdisciplinarity remains its 
residual disciplinarity.8 In response, recent attempts to distinguish, further, a 
                                            
4 Thus Antje Lann Hornscheidt and Susanne Baer: ‘we consider 
multidisciplinarity as a concept which is more relevant to mainstream research 
than to critical gender studies.’ (2011:165) 
5 A similar distinction between multi- and interdisciplinarity is drawn in Paul 
Stenner and David Taylor’s discussion of the emerging ‘transdisciplinary’ field 
of Psychosocial Studies, and in particular its deployment in Critical Social 
Policy Studies of welfare. See Stenner and Taylor, 2008: 429–30. 
6 See, for example, Rege Colet and Tardif, 2008, 17–18. Rege Colet and 
Tardif argue that across different definitions of interdisciplinarity three 
common principles emerge: that of the conceptual, theoretical and 
methodological integration of the disciplines; that of the collaboration between 
representatives of the disciplines; and that of the expected result – that 
(ideally) integration and collaboration might take the form of a synthesis 
leading to a ‘“non disciplinary” conception of “reality”.’ They similarly quote 
definitions of transdisciplinarity that aim at ‘the unity of knowledge.’ (2008: 18) 
7 In relation to Translation Studies see for example Malmkjaer 2005: 21 and 
Bassnett-McGuire 1998: xi. 
8 See Stenner and Taylor, 2008: 431: ‘Both multi and interdisciplinarity, then, 
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transdisciplinary practice in relation to gender studies have tended to see it 
as, in various ways, a higher-order, critical reflection on disciplines and on 
interdisciplinarity, which Hornscheidt and Baer, for example, describe as 
a reflexive way of dealing with disciplines, rather than a move against or 
beyond them … Transdisciplinarity is based upon a systematically critical 
reflection on all disciplines, their agenda, methodology and established 
findings … explicitly reflexive research. (2011: 165, 171)9 
Irene Dölling and Sabine Hark had earlier proposed a similar definition, in 
which transdisciplinarity involves ‘a critical evaluation of terms, concepts, and 
methods that transgresses disciplinary boundaries [that] can be a means to 
this higher level of reflexivity.’ (2000: 1195) For them, this ‘epistemological 
and methodological strategy’ depends on the refusal of the idea of disciplines 
as ‘independent domains with clear boundaries’, characterising them instead 
as always already (and from their inception) ‘shot through with cross-
disciplinary pathways.’ (2000: 1196) Dölling and Hark see transdisciplinarity 
as a way for gender studies to avoid the perils of institutionalisation – that is, 
its disciplinarization. For them transdisciplinarity, ‘characterized by a continual 
examination of artificially drawn and contingent boundaries and that which 
they exclude’ (2000: 1197), is essential for the future of gender studies, 
allowing it to ‘reflect on its own modes of knowledge production’ (2000: 1195), 
on ‘the contingency of its own premises and constructions’. (2000: 1197) Thus 
Dölling and Hark effectively recommend transdisciplinarity as something like 
Hornscheidt and Baer’s ‘reflexive way of dealing with disciplines’ in relation to 
gender studies itself as (or in danger of becoming) a discipline – 
transdisciplinarity or die. 
In contrast, Nina Lykke’s definition of transdisciplinarity takes issue with 
the idea that it remains tied to the reflexive critique of disciplines. For Lykke, 
                                                                                                                             
remain disciplinary in form since the goals of such research remain discipline-
centred, even as they transform and give rise to new disciplines.’ 
9 In fact, Hornscheidt and Baer’s definition of interdisciplinary work is difficult, 
ultimately, to distinguish from their ‘transdisciplinarity’: ‘interdisciplinary work 
… means more than adding and in a simple sense combining knowledge. By 
elucidating approaches chosen within disciplines and articulating their 
limitations, a sharp awareness of the disciplines’ varying ways to produce 
knowledge can be developed, including a critical assessment of the questions 
posed, the theories applied and the methods used, as well as the disciplinary 
genre conventions governing how research is re/presented.’ (2011: 170)  
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transdisciplinarity ‘goes beyond the boundaries of existing disciplines. In the 
transdisciplinary mode research problems and thinking technologies are 
articulated in ways that are not “owned” by any specific discipline’. (2011: 142) 
This is a characterisation that bears some resemblance to the Science and 
Technology Studies’ understanding of transdisciplinarity as Mode 2 
Knowledge Production.10 However, none of these competing 
characterisations is really part of a disagreement about the nature of a 
common practice; they are all, rather, different stipulative definitions of a word 
– less descriptions of practices than outlines of the shapes of their ideals. Of 
course, the problem of the transition from ideal to actuality – where what 
ought to be, is – has long been acknowledged. And this is as true of 
interdisciplinarity as it is of the higher-level transdisciplinary reflection that 
some of these authors propose here. That the difficulties in achieving ‘true’ 
interdisciplinarity should not be underestimated is made clear in the report 
from the Practising Interdisciplinarity group of the research project ‘Travelling 
Concepts in Feminist Pedagogy: European Perspectives’.11 The ‘Travelling 
Concepts’ project was ‘dedicated to mapping and interrogating movements of 
key concepts in feminist theory within and across Europe.’ The contribution to 
this project of the Practising Interdisciplinarity group focused on the concept of 
interdisciplinarity, setting out from the acknowledgement that, despite the 
ubiquity of claims to an actual or ideal interdisciplinarity in gender and feminist 
studies, the precise meaning of the concept and the extension of the practices 
actually covered by it remain unclear. This was connected to their ‘shared 
experience of disappointment that a claim to interdisciplinarity in feminist 
teaching or research often turns out to be a misleading description of what 
might be more accurately termed multidisciplinarity.’ (Demény  et al, 2006: 8) 
                                            
10 Indeed, Lykke (2011: 139) identifies the point of emergence of the concept 
of transdisciplinarity precisely in the work of the authors associated with Mode 
2 knowledge production: Gibbons et al, 1994 and Nowotny et al, 2001. 
Lykke’s definition of transdisciplinarity is taken up in, for example, Sari Irni, 
2013: 348. Stenner and Taylor (2008: 430), whilst not endorsing the 
‘somewhat utilitarian and pragmatic’ conception of transdiciplinarity as Mode 2 
knowledge production, similiarly see the specificity of transdiscplinarity in its 
‘going beyond’. 
11 Conducted under the umbrella of the Athena Network Project pursued by 
researchers and teachers from various Women’s and Gender Studies 
programmes across Europe. See Demény et al, 2006, and www.athena2.org. 
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 As part of the attempt to overcome this, the Practising 
Interdisciplinarity group offer their own definition: ‘interdisciplinarity involves 
working at the interstices of disciplines, in order to challenge those boundaries 
as part of extending possible meanings and practices’, constituting a ‘spatio-
ethical challenge to disciplinary boundaries.’ (Demény  et al, 2006: 54)12 This 
connects to their earlier finding that it is a focus on the ‘critical relationships 
among disciplinary fields’ that mitigates against self-styled ‘interdisciplinarity’ 
sliding into an unwitting multidisciplinarity. Referring to Lykke’s definition, they 
suggest that ‘transdisciplinarity’ (in feminist studies specifically) goes ‘beyond 
disciplines and beyond existing canons’, perhaps ‘creating a new theoretical 
canon for feminist studies’ or ‘proposing feminist studies as a discipline in its 
own right’ – an outcome towards which the authors are strikingly ambivalent. 
(Demény  et al, 2006: 51, 63–4) 
Differences and disagreements apart, the common point in all of the 
literature discussed here is in the presumption that inter- and trans-
disciplinarity in gender studies – however they are defined – refer to practices 
and forms of institutional or intellectual collaboration: research methodologies, 
research programmes, institutionally defined intellectual groupings and, 
mutatis mutandis, relations between disciplines and new ‘transdisciplines’ or 
‘postdisciplines’. The Practising Interdisciplinarity group identified different 
disciplinary methodologies as the major intellectual stumbling block in 
interdisciplinary endeavours. (Demény  et al, 2006: 46)13 Perhaps the idea of 
                                            
12 Whereas those gender studies programmes ‘housed within a discipline tend 
to focus on “gendering” the particular discipline in question’, (Demény  et al, 
2006: 54), opening it up to gender issues without fundamentally challenging it. 
13 Although the groups found that the major obstacles to genuinely 
interdisciplinary programmes were institutional. (See Demény et al, 2006, 
especially ‘Institutional Contexts of Interdisciplinarity I, II, and III, 38–62.) The 
institutional obstacles principally concern resources. For example, the group 
argue convincingly that for true interdisciplinarity to emerge in team-taught 
programmes, the teaching team should be familiar with each other’s 
disciplines, but institutional resources (for these purposes translated into 
allocations on individuals’ timetables) rarely allow individuals the time to 
attend each other’s lectures etc. 
Darbellay (2005:13–14) identifies four principal obstructions to inter- 
and transdisciplinary research: epistemological [or perhaps methodological]; 
institutional; psycho-sociological; and cultural (including different languages 
and ‘mentalities’. 
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a transdisciplinary method is in part a response to this, but the findings of the 
Practising Interdisciplinarity group suggest that the actual practice of 
transdisciplinary methods in gender studies may be elusive. 
 
Have concept, will travel 
Without disagreeing with either the aspiration towards or the actual practice of 
inter- and transdisciplinarity as these authors understand it, the idea proposed 
here – that gender is a specifically transdisciplinary concept – suggests 
something else. Of course, the foregrounding of concepts in interdisciplinary 
fields is not new. Indeed, the title of the research programme of the Practising 
Interdisciplinarity group was ‘Travelling Concepts in Feminist Pedagogy: 
European Perspectives’. This is borrowed from Mieke’s Bal’s 2002 Travelling 
Concepts in the Humanities: A Rough Guide, and we can see that some of 
the findings echo Bal’s starting point too. Bal argues in Travelling Concepts 
that the main problem faced by the would-be-interdisciplinary scholar in the 
humanities is that of method. Whereas one might have expected new ‘inter-
disciplines’ – particularly Cultural Studies (and, we might add, gender studies) 
– to have developed a new methodology ‘to counter the exclusionary methods 
of the separate disciplines’ they have not; old disciplinary methods tend to 
reassert themselves, even where new fields of objects for analysis have 
opened up. (2002: 6–7) Bal’s wager, then, is that ‘interdisciplinarity in the 
humanities, necessary, exciting, serious, must seek its heuristic and 
methodological basis in concepts rather than methods.’ (2002: 5) To explain 
this Bal presents us with a little vignette: 
A philosopher, a psychoanalytic critic, a narratologist, an architechtural 
historian, and an art historian are talking together in a seminar about, say, 
‘signs and ideologies’. Eager young scholars, excited, committed. The word 
‘subject’ comes up and keeps recurring. With growing bewilderment, the first 
participant assumes the topic is the rise of individualism; the second sees it 
as the unconscious; the third, the narrator’s voice; the fourth, the human 
confronted with space; and the fifth, the subject matter of a painting or, more 
sophisticatedly, the depicted figure. This could be just amusing, if only all five 




did not take their interpretation of ‘subject’, on the sub-reflective level of 
obviousness, to be the only right one. They are, in their own eyes, just 
‘applying a method’. Not because they are selfish, stupid, or uneducated, but 
because their disciplinary training has never given them the opportunity, or a 
reason, to consider the possibility that such a simple word as ‘subject’ might, 
in fact, be a concept. (2002: 5–6) 
Bal identifies three principal roots of this confusion of tongues: the 
tendency to conflate words (‘from everyday language’) and concepts; lack of 
attention to the fact that a concept may have ‘travelled’ from one discipline to 
another and got ‘muddled in a mixed setting’; and the partial overlap of 
concepts that ‘is an inevitable consequence of their creation and subsequent 
adjustment within the separate disciplines … this overlap leads to their 
confused and vague use in interdisciplinary work.’ (2002: 26, 25, 14) To move 
from ‘a muddled multidisciplinarity to a productive interdisciplinarity’ Bal thus 
advocates that we get clear about our concepts, but not in the manner of 
analytical philosophy. Concepts, obviously, will never be univocal terms. But 
Bal suggests that in ‘groping to define, provisionally and partly, what a 
particular concept may mean, we gain an insight into what it can do.’ Our 
concepts thus (provisionally, partly) defined can act as beacons with which we 
might orient ourselves in the ‘labyrinthine land of a humanities without 
boundaries.’ (2002: 25, 11, 8) Travelling Concepts devotes each chapter to a 
‘case study’ of a concept that has travelled from one place (ordinary 
language, a discipline, a practice) to another. She discusses, for example, the 
travel of the concept of mise-en-scène from theatre to psychoanalysis (in 
Freud’s Interpretation of Dreams), a journey in which, for Bal, mise-en-scène 
precisely becomes a concept, or a ‘conceptual tool’ (2002: 129) capable of 
articulating the ‘staging’ of the subject, and not just an artistic practice.14 In 
another chapter Bal refers to Jonathan Culler’s account of the travels of the 
concept of the performative (or performativity) from philosophy, to literature, to 
gender studies, and confronts this with the different journey of the concept of 
                                            
14 See Bal, 2002, Chapter 3, especially 106–111. See also 15: ‘[In Chapter 3] 
a concept from artistic practice – mise-en-scène – is deployed as a theoretical 
concept for cultural analysis.’ 
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‘performance’ whose ‘home’ she writes, ‘is not philosophy of language but 
aesthetics.’ (2002: 179). 
At one point, where the distinction between inter-, multi- and 
transdisciplinarity is explicitly broached, Bal describes the ‘inter-disciplinary’ 
itinerary of the concept of ‘focalization’: 
After travelling first from the visual domain to narratology, then to the more 
specific analysis of visual images, focalization, having arrived at its new 
destination, visual analysis, has received a meaning that overlaps neither with 
the old visual one – focusing with a lens – nor with the new narratological one 
– the cluster of perception and interpretation that guides the attention through 
the narrative. 
This travelling from one discipline to another, undergoing change in the 
process, is according to Bal,  ‘inter-disciplinary’ as opposed to 
‘transdisciplinary’, as the latter would ‘presuppose its immutable rigidity, a 
travelling without changing.’ (2002: 39) Just over one decade later it seems 
odd that ‘trans’ should evoke ‘immutable rigidity’; which just goes to show that 
prefixes can travel too. Bal continues: ‘to call it “multidisciplinary” would be to 
subject the fields of the two disciplines to a common analytic tool’; that is, one 
presumes, to apply the same concept in different disciplines indifferently. 
Neither the trans- nor the multi- option is viable for Bal: ‘Instead, a negotiation, 
a transformation, a reassessment is needed at each stage.’ (2002: 39)15 
Presuming that no one wants to defend ‘immutable rigidity’, how, then, 
does Bal’s notion of interdisciplinarity differ from what I am are proposing here 
as transdisciplinarity? It is not Bal’s concern to map either the birth of 
concepts or their history. Nevertheless, certain claims are made about where 
concepts (or their embryonic selves, ‘words’) come from, and the extended 
metaphorics of ‘travel’ does suggest that they begin their journey somewhere. 
                                            
15 Earlier, however, referring back to her previous work, Bal writes that 
‘narrative’ and ‘focalization’ ‘are, in fact, good examples of transdisciplinary 
concepts.’ (2002: 10) See also 2002: 11: ‘“Narrative” is thus a 
transdisciplinary concept …’ This is perhaps an auto-critique of Bal’s earlier 
presumptions about narrative (‘at some point I realized that the reason I saw 
narrative in this way had to do with the concept of narrative that I had 
unreflectively endorsed’); but it seems to be a contradiction in relation to 
focalization, at least. It is perhaps surprising that the shared prefix of 
‘transdisciplinarity’ and ‘transformation’ did not catch this wordsmith’s 
attention. 
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Sometimes this is quite explicit, for example with the origin of the mise-en-
scène in theatre, of focalization in optics and of hybridity in biology, and in the 
claim that ‘the home of the word performance is … aesthetics.’ Indeed the 
disciplinary origins of concepts are often identified as the source of some of 
the confusion or muddle that ensues when they begin to travel, and when 
concepts become, once more, mere words or – worse – labels. (2002: 24, 
179, 17) However, the specificity of what I am here calling ‘transdisciplinary’ 
concepts is that they are, precisely, not identifiable with any specific 
disciplinary fields, either in their origin or in their application. This is not to say 
that they were necessarily conceived as such from the off, or purposively 
created to be transdisciplinary, but that this is the manner of their emergence 
and their functioning, in so far as they are theoretically significant. A case 
study of our own, concerning the concept of gender in feminist theory, will 
hopefully justify this claim. Indeed, an account of the transdisciplinary 
functioning of the concept of gender may be exemplary in relation to all 
transdisciplinary concepts. 
 
Gender and feminist theory 
Unlike the concepts that Bal traces, ‘gender’, in its transdiciplinary form – that 
is, its feminist form – is a relatively recent construction. To track the 
emergence of the concept of gender is, necessarily, to track its relation to 
another concept – sex – or to track the emergence of the sex/gender 
distinction. It would not be possible to give a comprehensive picture of this 
theoretical history here, but nor is it necessary. In order to make the point that 
the feminist concept of gender is a transdisciplinary one, I will therefore limit 
myself to the discussion of just a couple of emblematic examples. Further, as 
we shall see, the fact that the meaning of the term is contested will not mean 
that it is necessary to choose one definition from among many, when the point 
is precisely that this internal diversity of meaning belongs to the very concept 
itself. 
 One common narrative of the origin of the concept of gender in its 
conceptual distinction from sex begins with Robert Stoller’s psychoanalytical 
theory (Stoller, 1968), and tracks the swift reception and deployment of the 
theoretical distinction in feminist work in different disciplines. Stoller was clear 
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that ‘sex’ was a biological term. But his concept of ‘gender’ – as he was the 
first to admit – is more difficult to pin down,16 encompassing, in a sense, 
everything that is related to the fact of sex division and that is yet not itself 
‘biological’. Abstracting from biological sex we are left with ‘tremendous areas 
of behaviour, feelings, thoughts, and fantasies that are related to the sexes 
and yet do not have primarily biological connotations. It is for some of these 
psychological phenomena that the term gender will be used.’ (Stoller, 1968: 
ix) 
In fact Stoller credited Freud (and in particular his The Interpretation of 
Dreams and Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality) with the insight that led 
to the terminological distinction between sex and gender: the insight that 
‘masculinity’ and ‘femininity’ are not bound to sex in a ‘one-to-one 
relationship.’ (Stoller, 1968: ix)17 For Stoller, ‘gender role’ is ‘the overt 
behaviour one displays in society, the role which he [sic] plays, especially with 
other people, to establish his position with them insofar as his and their 
evaluation of his gender is concerned’. (Stoller, 1968: 10)18 ‘Gender identity’ – 
which is the main topic of Sex and Gender – is the knowledge and awareness 
of being either male or female, one’s sense of being either a man or a woman. 
But although Stoller thus, in principle, distinguishes a social or cultural realm 
of ‘gender’, in relation to which a psychological notion of ‘gender identity’ is 
developed, he effectively conflates ‘gender’ with ‘gender identity’, such that 
‘gender’ tends to function in Sex and Gender as itself a psychological 
category. Thus although his central conclusion in Sex and Gender is that 
gender identity is learned, not biologically determined (Stoller, 1968: xiii) the 
focus is always less on the broader social or relational aspects of gender, in 
                                            
16 In Sex and Gender Stoller writes, that his ‘sidestepping a serious attempt to 
define gender and gender identity’ will be evident to his reader. (Stoller, 1968: 
xi) 
17 See, for example, the footnote added to the 1915 edition of the Three 
Essays on the Theory of Sexuality (Freud, 2001: 219–10), where Freud 
distinguishes between three ‘uses’ of the terms ‘masculinity’ and ‘femininity’ – 
the psychological, the biological and the sociological. This debt to Freud is 
perhaps under-recognised in gender studies, which has tended to be hostile 
to psychoanalysis. Its importance is recognised in Connell (2002: 120) and 
Chanter (2006). 
18 Stoller also calls this ‘gender behaviour’. (Stoller, 1968: x) 
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favour of the individual’s sense of him- or herself as male or female – what 
Stoller called the ‘core gender identity’. (Stoller, 1968: 29–46) 
 If, then, we trace the feminist distinction between sex and gender back 
to Stoller’s work, we would have to say that his feminist readers were 
productively interpreting awry. Ann Oakley’s statement of the distinction in 
Sex, Gender and Society – which was published in 1972 and  includes a long 
discussion of Stoller – presents the distinction in its classic early form. Oakley 
echoes Stoller with the claim that ‘“Sex” is a biological term: “gender” a 
psychological and cultural one’ (1972: 158), but the addition of ‘society’ to the 
‘sex’ and ‘gender’ of her title and the – actually extremely subtle – feminist 
orientation of her analysis turns ‘gender’ into a critical term for social analysis, 
when it was nothing like this for Stoller.19 When, in 1980, Michèle Barrett, in 
the context of a discussion of women’s oppression, reiterated the distinction 
between the biological category of sex and the ‘social’ category of gender 
(1980: 13), and insisted that ‘any feminism [including Marxist feminism] must 
insist on the specific character of gender relations … to identify the operation 
of gender relations’ (1980: 9), the implicit critical function of ‘gender’ is again 
brought to the fore. Identifying certain social phenomena in terms of gender 
was to historicize them – to render their contingency visible – against their 
naturalization in terms of sex.  
 But it is a curious irony that both sex/gender feminists and their 
ideological opponents – the apologists for existing inequality and oppression – 
largely shared a concept of sex, even if the defenders of the sexual status quo 
had no concept of gender. Barrett, for example, identified sex difference – or 
biological differences more generally – as simply existing at a level of reality 
not open to question. Drawing on the work of the Italian Marxist Sebastiano 
Timpanaro (On Materialism, first published 1975), Barrett wrote that ‘sex 
differences, along with other biological characteristics of human beings, … 
form part of the raw material on which social relations are constructed and 
which they transform in the course of history.’ Thus Barrett asserts her 
                                            
19 John Money and Anke A. Ehrhardt, in Man and Woman, Boy and Girl 
(1972: 4)), reproduce Stoller’s definitions of gender identity and gender role, 
but without any reflection on the category of gender itself. And it is very clear 
that for Money and Ehrhardt ‘gender’ is a normative, not a critical, category. 
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materialist credentials, accepting, further – rhetorical hesitations 
notwithstanding – the idea of the ‘biological liabilities’ (again, Timpanaro’s 
phrase) of the ‘female condition’. (Barrett, 1980: 74, 75) 
Others, however, drew different conclusions. In an essay first published 
in 1991, Christine Delphy, for example, claims that ‘The notion of gender 
developed from that of sex roles, and, rightly or wrongly, the person who is 
credited with being the founding mother of this line of thought is 
[anthropologist] Margaret Mead.’ (Delphy, 2000: 63) Referring to Mead’s Sex 
and Temperament in Three Primitive Societies (1935), Delphy ties the 
emergence of ‘gender’ to the foundational anthropological distinction between 
nature and culture and traces its development (via the critical development of 
the idea of sex roles) in sociology. Delphy cites Oakley’s book – ‘one of the 
first works directly on “gender”’ (Delphy, 2000: 65) – but notes that its 
definition of gender lacks what the earlier sociological work on ‘sex roles’ had, 
crucially, made central to their analyses: asymmetry and hierarchy. (Although 
Oakley cites some of the same feminist sociologists to whom Delphy refers: 
Mathilde Vaerting, Mirra Komarovsky and Viola Klein.) For Delphy the ‘arrival 
of the concept of gender’ did not place it side by side with sex, marking off a 
realm of cultural or socially constructed (and thus mutable) phenomena from 
the realm of biology. As a singular term it allowed the emphasis to shift from 
the two divided parts of sex to the ‘principle of partition itself’ and, as the ‘idea 
of hierarchy was firmly anchored in the concept’, it ‘allowed the relation 
between the divided parts to be considered from another angle.’ (Delphy, 
2000: 66) Tracing the genealogy of the concept of gender to the idea of ‘sex 
roles’, inextricably tied to social status, Delphy describes the perspective in 
which they now both appear as ‘sociological in the true sense of the word: 
people’s situations and activities are held to derive from the social structure, 
rather than from either nature or their particular capacities.’ Thus the stage is 
set for the explanatory priority of gender as a social relation, with sex 
relegated, as it were, to the mark of a social division: ‘sex is a sign’. (Delphy, 
2000: 64, 69) If for Barrett it was the affirmation of the natural reality of sex 
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that made a feminist also a materialist, for Delphy it was, on the contrary, the 
refusal of the category of sex as natural.20 
Of course one could cite very many other accounts of the emergence 
of the sex/gender distinction and trace very many other possible genealogies, 
in relation to different national, continental and global concerns. Together 
these different accounts would build a complex picture of the historical 
‘invention’ of the concept of gender. I have made no attempt to be 
comprehensive here because the aim is not to write that complex history but 
merely to indicate the transdisciplinary mode of emergence of the critical 
feminist concept of gender. If one were to attempt to write that complex 
history one would no doubt find that different narratives of the development of 
the concept of gender would contest each other, and one could then, if one 
was so inclined, pursue the project of working out which of them is most 
accurate. But that would be to overlook the on-going collective construction of 
the concept. Perhaps we could say that each part of this intellectual history 
continues to circulate in a discontinuous construction, not of a concept of 
gender, but a dynamic conceptual constellation of constructions of gender? 
To this extent ‘gender’ has not been quieted by being subject to any definition, 
and this may be precisely because it did not come from, has not and will not 
be settled, into any one discipline or even inter-discipline in particular – that is, 
because it is a transdisciplinary concept. 
One does not have to look far to see that the critique of the sex/gender 
distinction as it appears in, for example, Oakley and Barrett, was almost 
immediately part of the on-going construction of the concept of gender. In fact 
‘gender’ quickly outgrew its opposition to sex, in a series of theoretical moves 
(most familiarly in Delphy, Wittig and Butler) that drew ‘sex’ itself into 
question.21 Further, the critique of the presumption that feminist work in other 
                                            
20 Of course, there are different conceptions of materialism at stake for each 
author here. Barrett’s ‘materialism’ is effectively ‘naturalism’; Delphy’s is the 
practical materialism of Marx. 
21 Moira Gatens’s well-known ‘A Critique of the Sex/Gender Distinction’ was 
published in 1983. Jean Grimshaw’s Feminist Philosophers: Women’s 
Perspectives on Philosophical Traditions (1986) one of the first Anglophone 
(and perhaps the first of the important British) books of feminist philosophy, 
contained a critique of the sex/gender distinction (128–133), largely based on 
the need for a critical reflection on the realm of the biological. On the other 
 16 
languages could always be translated into the Anglophone sex/gender 
distinction – and indeed resistance to the conceptual hegemony of the 
Anglophone distinction – has now become part of critical reflection on its 
introduction and use.22 But feminists (and not just Anglophone ones) continue 
to use the category of gender; some of us continue to speak of gender studies 
and gender critique and gender analysis because in certain contexts we 
continue to find it an indispensable critical, transdisciplinary concept.   
 
Critical transdisciplinarity 
What, then, is transdisciplinarity, such that we can say that gender is a 
transdisciplinary concept? In beginning a collective attempt to construct a 
concept of transdisciplinarity,23 my colleagues and I set out from the 
contention that, in the late-twentieth century (from the early 1970s, let us say), 
the humanities, in the English-speaking world, but with the notable exception 
of mainstream philosophy, were transformed by the reception of a set of 
mainly French and German transdisciplinary texts or discourses published or 
originating in the middle of the 20th Century. These include Simone de 
Beauvoir’s The Second Sex, Frantz Fanon’s Black Skin, White Masks, 
Theodor Adorno and Max Horkheimer’s Dialectic of Enlightenment and Michel 
Foucault’s The Order of Things, amongst many significant others. This 
reception took place in a range of specific disciplinary contexts (especially 
                                                                                                                             
hand Carol Pateman’s The Sexual Contract (1988: 225–6) rejects the idea of 
‘gender’ to the extent that she associates this (as did Grimshaw (1986: 144), 
in part) with the ideal of a sex-neutral ‘individual’ as the basis of political 
thought; that is, largely because of a need for a critical reflection on the realm 
of civil society. Genevieve’s Lloyd’s The Man of Reason: Male and Female in 
Western Philosophy (1984) seems to have been written without notice of the 
sex/gender distinction (the word ‘gender’ and its cognates appear very 
infrequently, and as synonyms for ‘sex’). Responding in 1993 (in the second 
edition) to the criticism that the sex/gender distinction was ‘perversely blurred’ 
in The Man of Reason, Lloyd argued that her object – ‘the symbolic content of 
maleness and femaleness’ – ‘belongs properly neither with sex nor with 
gender.’ (1993: ix) But here Lloyd associates ‘gender’ only with ‘socially 
produced masculinity and femininity’ and ‘gender identity’. 
22 See, in particular, Braidotti 2002. 
23 The research project, ‘Transdisciplinarity and the Humanities: Problems, 




English Literary Studies, and the ‘new’ disciplines of Cultural Studies, Film 
Studies and, later, Postcolonial Studies), at the same time as feminist theory 
was all over the humanities and social science – again, with the notable 
exception of mainstream philosophy. A few years later the same could 
perhaps be said of the influence of critical race theory.                                                                                                                                                                                                              
 Accustomed as we are to assigning works to disciplines, some of these 
texts might now be thought of as belonging to ‘continental philosophy’, or as 
having a right to belong to philosophy understood more broadly (as in the 
case of The Second Sex, which some have argued deserves to be included in 
the canon of philosophy, thus stamping it with the mark of the discipline). 
Some of this work belongs to the German tradition of ‘critical theory’, 
associated with the Institute for Social Research, originally based in Frankfurt. 
In the 1970s and 1980s German critical theory, along with the theoretical work 
of various, heterogeneous but broadly leftist, French writers including Lacan, 
Foucault, Barthes, Deleuze, and so on were received into the Anglophone 
humanities – again, largely excluding philosophy – and put to work to further 
produce what was sometimes called ‘high theory’ or simply ‘Theory’.24 Both 
German critical theory and the relevant theoretical discourses from France 
were explicitly – constitutionally – critical of the dominant disciplinary forms of 
philosophy to the extent that these dominant forms were, or conceived 
themselves to be, ‘self-sufficient’, in Marx’s sense – independent of and 
uninfluenced by any empirical content: idealist and thereby (unwittingly) 
ideological.25 If these German and French works are still nevertheless 
‘philosophical’ – and still laying claim, some of them, to the title of ‘philosophy’ 
– it is in part because of their relation to the history of philosophy; because of 
their universalist aspirations (albeit a universal viewed historically); and 
because they still involve conceptual abstraction at the highest level – the 
traditional practice of philosophy – yet with an insistence on the social and 
                                            
24 See Osborne, 2001b:19–20. 
25 Frédéric Darbellay (2005: 10) notes – without fully endorsing it – the co-
incidence of radical critiques of disciplinarity and the critique of the University 
(‘its modes of construction and transmission of knowledge’) in the 1960s in 
France, culminating in 1968. This history of the critique of institutional forms is 
most obviously connected to the history of the critique of disciplines in the 
case of Philosophy. 
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historical conditions of possibility for such abstractions; along with their use in 
the criticism of what Marx and Engels, in The German Ideology rather 
straightforwardly call, ‘reality’ (1974: 41, 48). 
 Of course, none of these texts – not even Beauvoir's The Second Sex 
– proposed a concept of gender; far from it. But we can now see that what the 
transdisciplinary field of feminist theory, from which the concept of gender did 
arise, shares with this tradition of critique. The model for this is Marx’s critique 
of political economy, which did not just criticise existing theories of political 
economy, but proposed a new set of categories, at once both political-
economic and philosophical in form – abstract labour, labour-power, value-
form, and so on. People tend to misinterpret Marx’s relation to philosophy as a 
rejection of it; in fact the overcoming of classical German philosophy was for 
Marx its transformation into critique. Critique – or its theoretical result, critical 
theory – is the name for a transformed practice of philosophy, no longer self-
sufficient and idealist but historically and practically based and materialist. 
There are, of course, traditions of Marxist feminist theory that share 
their intellectual roots with critical theory. But, unlike critical theory, Marxist 
feminist theory was very little interested in the criticism of philosophy – it was 
more interested in the criticism of Marxism – and we do not tend to number 
amongst the many varieties of feminist theory something like a ‘critical theory’ 
variant. However, as Kate Soper pointed out in 1989, there is a sense in 
which feminist critique is critical theory. In fact, Soper drew attention to what 
she called ‘the distinctly “Marxian” character of feminist criticism’, which was 
not to say that all feminists are Marxists – Soper saw that that would be an 
absurd claim – but that ‘feminist argument conforms with the theoretical 
exercise conducted by Marx under the name of “critique” in fusing critical and 
substantive elements. The Marxist critique, in explaining the source in reality 
of the cognitive shortcomings of the theory under attack, called for changes in 
reality itself.’ (1989: 93) This means that feminist theory, just in so far as it is 
feminist, is constructed with an emancipatory aim: it is not politically neutral, 
and it conceives of itself as practical criticism. Further, the process of feminist 
critique is such that in criticising the terms – the philosophical presuppositions 
– of a given theory or ideology, it proposes new terms (this, I think, is what 
Soper means by ‘substantive elements’). One of the new terms proposed by 
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feminist theory in its criticism of existing theories or ideologies was that of 
‘gender’. This means that the category of gender does not just slot in 
alongside the existing terms upon which any given theoretical structure is 
based; rather, it destabilises that structure and is part of the proposal to build 
another. 
The critical practice of feminist theory is, as I said before, a 
transdisciplinary practice. It operates with what we should now, I suggest, 
recognise as a set of transdisciplinary concepts, including, sex, gender, 
woman, sexuality and sexual difference.26 At least one of these is required for 
a feminist theory. Historically, however, the most important of these in 
Anglophone theory is probably ‘gender’. There may be specific disciplinary 
uses of the term ‘gender’; other specific uses of the term may be intra-
disciplinarily defined. But the theoretical productivity of the concept of ‘gender’ 
in feminist theory is down to its transdisciplinary functioning. We may take 
Judith Butler’s early work to be emblematic of the productive deployment of a 
transdisciplinary concept of gender. 
 
Philosophy: the recalcitrant discipline 
So, to return to our original question: what happens when well defined 
disciplines meet or are confronted with transdisciplinary discourses and 
concepts? Or, if disciplines reject transdisciplinary discourses and concepts, 
why do they so reject them? Joan Scott’s famous essay from 1986, ‘Gender: 
A Useful Category of Historical Analysis’, goes some way towards answering 
this in her reflection on the encounter between the discipline of history and the 
transdisciplinary concept of gender; although, of course, Scott herself does 
not use the vocabulary of ‘transdisciplinarity’. Scott distinguished between 
descriptive and analytic uses of the concept of ‘gender’ by historians, a 
distinction that holds good across other disciplines. In stark contrast with 
philosophy, the incursion of ‘gender’ into history was already so advanced by 
1986 that Scott was in a position to criticise feminist historians’ uses of it. In 
philosophy in 1986 feminists were still slapping each other on the back if any 
of them had managed to smuggle it in anywhere. That was the year of the first 
                                            
26 For an argument concerning the transdiciplinary nature of the concept of 
sex see Sandford, 2011. 
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issue of Hypatia as a stand-alone academic journal of feminist philosophy,27 
only 3 years after the first special issue of Radical Philosophy on ‘Women, 
Gender and Philosophy’, in which the issue editor, Alison Assiter, wrote of the 
dearth of feminist writing in philosophy compared with literary studies, 
economics and the social sciences more generally. (Assiter, 1983: 1) 
Scott criticised the descriptive uses of the concept of gender by 
feminist historians, uses in which, at their simplest, ‘“gender” is a synonym for 
“women”’, associated with the study of things related to women. (Scott, 1986: 
1056) According to Scott, the descriptive approach has no power to address 
or change existing disciplinary paradigms28 (a problem which, mutatis 
mutandis, would, as we have seen, echo through discussions of multi- and 
interdisciplinarity in gender studies). Gender as an analytic category, on the 
other hand, was, Scott writes, introduced into the discipline of history precisely 
with the intention of challenging and transforming disciplinary paradigms and 
dominant disciplinary concepts – to transform the nature of the discipline of 
history itself. Thus we can see, I think, how Scott’s work is part of that tradition 
of feminist critique identified by Soper. For Scott ‘gender’ is a ‘new’ category 
that allows us to question the assumptions of existing theoretical discourses 
(which we may or may not want to call ideological) and to provide the basis for 
                                            
27 Hypatia began in 1982, ‘piggy-backing’ on Women’s Studies International 
Forum.  
28 More recently Claire Hemmings (2011: 10) has made a similar point about 
the institutional life, in the UK, of what is now called ‘gender studies’, 
‘supported where it is harnessed to globalisation and seen as producing future 
gender mainstreaming or gender experts’, her example being the London 
School of Economics, where she herself works. Looking back on her 1986 
essay in 2010, Scott also noted the ‘recuperation’ of the word ‘gender’, for 
example in the official report on 1995 United Nations Fourth World Congress 
on Women (Beijing), where gender ‘was an innocuous term, often simply a 
substitute for “women”.’ (Scott, 2010: 9) 
 In an interview from 2004, reflecting on her critique of the sex/gender 
distinction, Gatens too identifies the tendency to equate ‘gender’ and ‘women’. 
(2004: 214) Gatens seems unwilling to recognise any positive role, 
historically, for gender as an analytical or critical concept (‘I thought the 
replacement of “sex” with “gender” was a bad move politically, a suspect 
move.’ Gatens regrets the fact that the introduction of ‘gender’ left ‘the body 
and corporeality out of the picture’ (2004: 213), but fails, absolutely, to 
acknowledge how the concept of gender was used strategically as a critique 
of the pre-feminist use of the concept of sex. And, after all, the pre-feminist 
concept of sex is still with us. 
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a more adequate understanding of social phenomena. Accordingly, it is not 
difficult to see why any discipline is likely to refuse or react with some hostility 
to the incursion of a transdisciplinary concept like gender. For it does not just 
find a place for itself within existing theoretical discourses or present itself as 
a new object to them; it challenges them to transform themselves according to 
its demands. (This is also why orthodox Marxism finds ‘gender’ difficult.) It is 
not difficult to see, further, why it should be the discipline of philosophy that 
has been most resistant and hostile to feminist theory and its transdisciplinary 
concepts. It is because philosophy has so much invested in distinguishing 
itself from other disciplines on the basis of its conceptual self-sufficiency, in 
policing its own boundaries and hanging on to its understanding of itself as a 
self-sufficient discipline that it rejected this challenge from the outside. 
Different national contexts and different philosophical traditions mean 
that there is not just one story to be told about the relation between feminism 
and philosophy. But on the whole, in the English-speaking world, mainstream 
philosophy resisted feminism and one of its main tactics was to deny that 
feminist philosophy was in fact ‘philosophy’ at all. Insofar as the concerns of 
feminist philosophy were thought to have something to do with gender, they 
were, for example, said to be the domain of sociology, not properly 
philosophical concerns. Readers outside of the academic discipline of 
philosophy may be puzzled by this characterisation of philosophy, especially if 
they work in or across those disciplines and interdisciplines and fields in which 
'continental' philosophy has been welcomed. But the claim is about the 
traditional, hegemonic academic discipline of philosophy, which generally 
continues to deny the legitimacy of 'continental' philosophy.29 However, if 
mainstream philosophy – that is, Anglo-American style analytical philosophy – 
rejected both inter- and transdsciplinarity and feminist theory, a certain kind of 
                                            
29 Of course other kinds of philosophy have flourished in all sorts of 
interdisciplinary spaces. In 'Out of Bounds: Philosophy in an Age of Transition' 
Rosi Braidotti and Judith Butler discuss precisely this – new philosophical 
practices and 'venues of thinking'. (Braidotti and Buter: 2013, 307) But this is 
precisely 'philosophy outside its bounds', not philosophy in traditional 
philosophy departments. There are stil plenty of people in plenty of traditional 
philosophy department who would not recognise anything that Bradotti and 
Butler (or Deleuze or Derrida etc, etc) do as 'philosophy'. 
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feminist philosophy embraced both with vigour. In her Inaugural Professorial 
Lecture in 1996 Margaret Whitford summed this up well: 
A feminist researcher is obliged to be interdisciplinary, with all the problems 
that this entails. I use the term 'feminist researcher' here for short, to refer to 
all those engaged in the different types of research which involve the 
generation, exploration or application of feminist theory. In the area where I 
would situate myself, for example, that of feminist philosophy, once one takes 
'gender' as an analytical category – whether this is seen as an empirical or as 
a conceptual category – one is more or less obliged to see what has 
happened to the concept in adjacent disciplines. And once one posits a 
structure as systemic, the supporting evidence cannot be confined to one 
discipline only, but gains in weight and plausibility from making links with 
evidence or arguments in other disciplines. Although without aspiring to the 
comprehensiveness of Simone de Beauvoir's The Second Sex, most feminist 
researchers in philosophy also read work in other fields – political theory, 
sociology, intellectual history, anthropology, literary theory, film theory, 
psychology, psychoanalytic theory – to name only the most obvious. … As an 
absolute minimum, we have to know about our own subject, plus feminist 
theory. (1996: 33–34) 
If this is not the case with the growing field of analytical feminist philosophy, 
this explains why it has no audience outside of the discipline, narrowly 
defined.  
Mainstream philosophy’s initial rejection of feminism was obviously 
narrow-minded and short-sighted. But, in fact, when those hostile to feminist 
philosophy saw in it something that was not philosophy, or not generated from 
within philosophy itself, they were quite right. Because the life-blood of 
feminist philosophy was feminist theory, which did not owe its origins to 
philosophy. A quick survey of recent articles on the multi-disciplinary origins of 
feminist theory confirms this. To take just one example, in the first issue of the 
UK journal Feminist Theory (in 2000) the editors note the generation of 
feminist theory from within the social sciences in the 1970s and 1980s and the 
subsequent shift to theoretical production in literary and cultural studies. Other 
contributors to this issue of Feminist Theory mention other disciplines as well; 
but not one of them mentions philosophy. No one outside of philosophy even 
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notices the absence of philosophy in their lists; philosophy is simply 
irrelevant.30 
As with gender studies, in attempts to specify the nature of feminist 
theory its inter- or multidisciplinary character is frequently mentioned as one of 
its defining and academically most positive features. But in disputes over the 
definition and nature of feminist theory – particularly from within Women’s 
Studies – what was primarily at issue for most discussants was not the 
relation between feminist theory and any specific discipline, or the disciplines 
in general, or disciplinarity but the relation between feminist theory and 
practice, that is, politics. Thus we can say that two constitutive features of 
feminist theory do indeed set it radically at odds with the traditional self-
understanding of philosophy as an academic discipline. First, feminist theory 
is explicitly tied to a political agenda for social change. Second, in contrast to 
mainstream philosophy feminist theory is a transdisciplinary practice, 
dependent on transdisciplinary concepts. 
Further, the disciplinary specificity of philosophy that predisposes it 
against transdisciplinary feminist theory is at the same time what predisposes 
it against becoming critical theory. If feminist theory is feminist critique this 
means that ‘feminist philosophy’ is, in a sense – just as those anti-feminist 
philosophers always suspected – something of a contradiction in terms, but 
for completely different reasons than they thought. Feminist philosophy is a 
contradiction not because, as feminist, it fails to live up to or to conform to 
some ideal of philosophy. On the contrary, it is contradictory precisely 
because it succeeds in being philosophy. The rich traditions of feminist 
epistemology, feminist metaphysics, feminist phenomenology, feminist 
philosophy of science and so on, as well as the fully-fledged feminist 
philosophy of sex and gender, amply demonstrate this. But feminst philosophy 
remains contradictory because, with its roots in feminist theory as a 
transdisciplinary practice of critique, it is the demand for the overcoming of 
philosophy, in Marx’s sense; that is, as we might put it now, the initial demand 
                                            
30 In the same issue (Griffin et al, 2000) Elizabeth Ermath asked ‘What Counts 
as Feminist Theory?’ and answered without ever referring to philosophy, 
feminist or otherwise. Sara Ahmed objected to the idea that anyone should be 
counting, but still attempted a characterisation of the diversity of feminist 
theory without, again, mentioning philosophy at all. 
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that it become – like feminist theory itself – critical theory. 31 But this is just 
what traditional philosophy, to the extent that it understands itself as a self-
sufficient discipline, cannot do. Its limitation – of which it is perversely proud – 
results in what Whitford called a ‘schizoid fission’ between itself and other 
forms of thought: its ‘defensive logic of exclusion makes it impossible to allow 
metabolic thought through contact with something other than itself.’ (Whitford, 
1996: 38) 
This clearly puts feminist philosophy in a difficult position, for it is part 
of the social and institutional reality that it criticises. Marx and the Marxist 
tradition of critical theory eschewed the name ‘philosophy’ in favour of 
‘critique’, ‘practical materialism’, and ‘critical theory’, partly in order to 
distinguish themselves from the ideological self-understanding of the old 
philosophy. However today, from within the academy, there are good political 
reasons to hang on to ‘philosophy’ and for feminists to hang on to the word, to 
name what they do ‘feminist philosophy’.32 To the extent that ‘feminist 
philosophy’ is a contradiction in terms it is therefore a contradiction that must 
be sustained as a productive contradiction. It cannot be resolved by rejecting 
philosophy or ceding it to its traditional self-understanding, which would only 
repeat the error of what Marx called the ‘practical political party’, because 
‘You cannot transcend [aufheben] philosophy without realizing [verwirklichen] 
                                            
31 Elizabeth Grosz (2009) criticises the idea that feminist theory is a primarily 
critical discourse, in favour of a description of it as the practice of the creation 
of concepts. But her Deleuzian account of ‘feminist theory’, which she 
effectively equates with ‘feminist philosophy’, swallows the former up into the 
latter, and gives a partial view in which most of what constitutes the history of 
feminist theory does not in fact qualify as ‘feminist theory’ on Grosz’s 
definition. (Neither does most of what makes up the history of feminist 
philosophy count as ‘feminist philosophy’.) Grosz seems to allow feminist 
philosophy, in its disciplinary specificity to define feminist theory, instead of 
seeing the theoretical dependence of feminist philosophy on the 
transdisciplinary and disciplinarily critical practice of feminist theory. Grosz’s 
position also seems to exclude the possibility that critical discourses construct 
concepts; the example of Marx shows this not be true. 
32 These reasons include the erosion of philosophy as critical discourse in 
favour of ‘critical thinking’, understood as the cultivation of ‘transferable skills’ 
for the job market, and the privileging of vocational subjects and science and 
technology disciplines, as part of an economistic devaluation of the 
humanities in general. For feminist philosophy, especially, the main point may 
still be not to cede ‘philosophy’ to the enemy’s ‘self-sufficient’ definition. 
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it.’ (Marx, 1992: 250) At the same time, however, feminist philosophy cannot 
realise itself, and cannot pit itself against a reality to be transformed, without 
taking account of the way in which feminist philosophy, as philosophy, 
belongs to this reality. Philosophy cannot be realised without being 
transcended, that is, without critique of philosophy, which for feminist 
philosophy means not without critique of itself as philosophy. 
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